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Is intraregional trade in Asia really integrating? It is not easy to answer this ostensibly 
simple question. There are two ways to assess the level of trade integration: de facto 
integration and de jure integration. With respect to de facto integration (actual level of 
interdependence in terms of trade flows), the answer depends on which Asian countries 
are being considered and which indicator is being using to measure trade 
interdependence. This paper compares the trade interdependence of different sets of 
Asian countries using various indices. With respect to de jure integration (the signing of 
free trade agreements [FTAs]), the number of signed FTAs in Asia is growing but the 
relation between trade interdependence and the signing of FTAs has not been 
sufficiently studied. The second half of this paper addresses whether de jure trade 
integration is ultimately brought about by high-level or low-level de facto trade integration. 
 
Keywords: FTAs, trade interdependence, scope of agreements 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Is intraregional trade in Asia really integrating? It is not easy to answer this ostensibly 
simple question. There are two ways to assess the level of trade integration: de facto 
integration and de jure integration. De facto trade integration refers to the actual growth 
of trade interactions within a region (Hurrell 1995). Because trade is basically a 
commercial matter, the focus of de facto trade integration is on private entities’ trade 
activities (trade transactions). De jure trade integration refers to the conscious policies of 
states to coordinate trade activities in a particular region (Wyatt-Walter 1995). Thus, the 
focus of de jure trade integration is governments’ activities, especially policies, relating to 
regional arrangements such as free trade agreements (FTAs).  
 
Assessing de facto trade integration depends primarily on which indicator to use in 
measuring the level of trade interdependence. Although there are some interesting 
studies on this issue using various indicators, including Petri (2006)
1 and Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon (2009),
2   an empirical assessment of the long-term trends of trade 
interdependence based on various indicators has not been conducted. It is also 
important to identify which set of Asian countries are being considered. The significance 
of indicators for actual trade interdependence varies depending on the composition of 
the group under review. While existing literature on Asia tends to focus on the trade 
interdependence of ASEAN or ASEAN+3, we should carefully assess the level of trade 
integration among various sets of Asian countries.
3   
 
With respect to de jure trade integration, many commentators have argued that Asia has 
been deepening its level of trade integration based on the simple observation that there 
are an ever-increasing number of Asian FTAs that have either been concluded or are 
under negotiation. However, the driving forces behind this phenomenon have not been 
fully analyzed. The principal question that has been insufficiently explored is the 
relationship between de facto and de jure trade integration. More specifically, whether de 
jure trade integration is brought about by high-level or low-level de facto trade 
integration?
4 Although there are studies that have analyzed the impact of FTAs on trade 
interdependence in the region, the reverse causality—the impact of trade 
interdependence on countries’ trade policies regarding FTAs—has not been sufficiently 
researched. While studies tends to assess whether the proliferation of FTAs in Asia can 
be explained by the overall development of trade interdependence in Asia, such a 
general analysis does not tell us much about the relationship between de facto and de 
jure trade integration. Rather, we need to examine the level of economic 
                                                  
1  Petri (2006) analyzes trade interdependence in Asia using three indicators (absolute measure, relative 
measure, and double-relative measure) that are similar to the analysis of this paper. However, his 
analysis of Asia is limited to comparing East Asia and the Pacific Rim to other regions, not assessing 
various sets of Asian countries. His analysis also includes individual countries’ linkages to regional 
economies.  
2  While they use only share and intensity indicators, Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2009) analyze trade 
interdependence in Asia at the commodity level.  
3  ASEAN+3 comprises the 10 member countries of ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
4  Theoretically, the change in the level of integration may be more important than the level itself in 
explaining changes in FTA policies.  Section 3 will discuss this point.  2   |   Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 91 
 
 
interdependence of a particular set of Asian countries and consider whether it affects the 
modality of economic agreement among them.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section assesses actual trade 
interdependence (de facto trade integration) among different sets of Asian countries 
using various indices. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), various 
groupings of ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, and various groupings of ASEAN+3+1 will be 
analyzed in turn. The third section analyzes the relationship between de facto trade 
integration and de jure trade integration. This section highlights various types of FTAs in 
Asia; those that deal with problems stemming from high levels of trade interdependence 
and those that are expected to increase trade among members. The fourth section 
considers policy implications for designing regional trade and economic agreements in 
Asia in terms of membership and scope. The final section summarizes the key 
messages of this paper.   
 
 
2.   Recent Development of Trade Interdependence in Asia 
 
2.1.   The Measurement of Regional Trade Bias 
 
We use three kinds of indices to assess the actual level of trade interdependence. The 
strengths and weakness of each index will be explained in turn. (For details of the 
indicators, see Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka 2010.) Annual data on total exports 
and imports are used in this research.
5 The analysis covers a 30-year period from 1980 
to 2009 to capture structural changes in Asian trade, including the appreciation of the 
Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985.   
 
Intraregional Trade Share = Tii ／ Ti 
 
Intraregional Trade Intensity Index = (Tii ／ Ti) ／ (Ti ／ Tw) 
 
Regional Trade Introversion Index = (HIi – HEi) ／ (HIi + HEi) 
 
Where  
HIi  = (Tii ／ Ti)  ／ (Toi ／ To) 






                                                  
5  We use the data on total exports and imports because the difference between the level of intraregional 
trade in agricultural products and non-agricultural products is small. According to Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon (2009), ASEAN+3's intraregional trade share in total non-oil trade is 38.7% and 
ASEAN+3's intra-regional trade share in primary products (excluding oil) is also 38.7%. This is mainly 
because the share of agricultural products in Asian trade is less than 10%.  Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   3 
 
 
Each variable is defined as  
Tii ≡ exports of region i to region i plus imports of region i from region i 
Ti ≡ total exports of region i to the world plus total imports of region i from the world 
Toi ≡ exports of region i to outsiders plus imports of region i from outsiders 
To ≡ total exports of outsiders plus total imports of outsiders 
Tw ≡ total world exports plus imports 
 
Intraregional trade share is a widely used index to assess the level of trade 
interdependence because the calculation is easy to make. However, it is a problematic 
indicator for two reasons: (i) the share can rise when more countries are included in the 
group even without a regional bias in trade between members,
6 and (ii) the share can 
increase when a large trading nation is included in a group even without a regional bias 
in trade (Anderson and Norheim 1993).
7 Thus, this indicator is not suitable for comparing 
across regions or groups, although it is useful in giving a snap shot of trade 
interdependence in a particular region.  
 
An intraregional trade intensity index is a more precise indicator for assessing a regional 
bias in trade because it accounts for the weight of the trade of member countries; the 
higher the rate, the higher the regional bias. If this intensity indicator is more than 1, then 
the region has a bias toward trading with itself; if the indicator is less than 1, then the 
region has a bias toward trading with outsiders. The major problem is that it only 
considers internal bias and not external bias. If we focus solely on internal bias, the 
following two scenarios look similar: (i) a region’s intraregional share is 20% and the 
region’s weight in world trade is 10%, and (ii) a region’s intraregional share is 40% and 
the region’s weight in world trade is 20%. In both cases, the intraregional share is double 
the region’s trade share in the world. However, the extra-regional bias of the two 
scenarios is not the same.
8 When we factor this in, the regional trade introversion index 
is the most suitable index to measure trade interdependence. It considers not only 
internal but also external bias of trade. In other words, the introversion index assesses 
the level of internal bias of trade in relation to external bias (relative regional bias of 
trade). If the indicator of introversion is equal to zero, then the region’s trade is 
geographically neutral. If it is greater than zero, the region’s trade has an intraregional 
bias; if it is less than zero, then the region’s trade has an extra-regional bias.  
 
                                                  
6  Imagine a hypothetical situation in which California is an independent country. Under this scenario, the 
intraregional share of North America comprising four entities—Canada, Mexico, the United States (US) 
ex California, and California—becomes larger than the share for North America comprising only three 
countries—Canada, Mexico, and the US—because trade between California and the US ex California is 
now considered international trade.  
7  Assume that the US’ share of world trade is 10% and that of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) is 0.1%. If the US’ share and the DPRK’s share in Country X’s trade are 10% and 0.1%, 
respectively, we cannot say that the country trades more with the US than with the DPRK in relative 
terms. However, the intraregional share of a group comprising the US and Country X becomes much 
higher than the group comprising the DPRK and Country X provided that the US and the DPRK do not 
have trade bias vis-à-vis Country X since the US is a large trading nation and the DPRK is not.  
8  In this hypothetical situation, while the ratios of internal bias are the same in the two scenarios, the 
external bias of the former is higher than that of the latter.  4   |   Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 91 
 
 
2.2.   Trade Interdependence of ASEAN  
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was launched in 1992, is one of the oldest 
FTAs in Asia.
9 Assessing the level of trade integration among ASEAN members provides 
a good starting point for the discussion on trade interdependence in Asia. We will use 
data for the ASEAN-6—the members of ASEAN when AFTA was established—for time-
consistency purposes.
10  We will compare ASEAN’s trade interdependence with the 
North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), comprising the US, Canada, and Mexico; and 
the European Union (EU). We will compute the EU’s indicators using trade among the 
EU-15 for the time-consistency purposes.
11 It is necessary to fix the countries that will be 
included to assess the trend of trade interdependence.  
 
Based on data from 2009, ASEAN’s intraregional trade share is extremely low at about 
0.2, compared with about 0.4 for NAFTA and 0.6 for the EU (Figure 1). While ASEAN’s 
intraregional share increased between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, it has remained at 
almost the same level since then. However, it would be misleading to overemphasize 
ASEAN’s low-level of trade interdependence based on this indicator alone. As we will 
see, it is still much higher than the intraregional trade share of other sets of Asian 
countries such as ASEAN+3.  
 
If we look at the intraregional intensity indicator, ASEAN’s figure is remarkable. It is 
much higher than the intensity of trade in the EU or NAFTA. While ASEAN’s figure is 
about 4.0, NAFTA’s is about 2.5 and the EU’s is less than 2.0. This means that ASEAN 
countries conduct a significant amount of trade with other members despite the fact that 
most member countries are relatively small trading nations. Unlike the case of trade 
share, ASEAN’s trade intensity sharply declined between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
Therefore, intraregional trade did not increase that much compared with the overall trade 
growth of ASEAN members during the same period.  
 
In terms of regional introversion, ASEAN’s figure is almost the same as the EU and 
NAFTA’s at about 0.7. However, the trends in each region over the past 3 decades are 
very different. ASEAN’s regional introversion index declined sharply between the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s (from 0.75 to 0.60), but showed an increasing trend after the mid-
1990s. In contrast, the introversion indices of NAFTA and the EU both show a similar 
and stable increasing trend over the past 3 decades.   
 
A comparison between various indicators tells us an interesting story of recent 
developments in ASEAN trade interdependence. The acceleration of intraregional trade 
in ASEAN, especially between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, is very similar to that of 
ASEAN+Japan, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. Such a coincidence 
implies that production networks produced by multinational corporations (MNCs), 
especially Japanese MNCs, contributed to the increase of trade not only between Japan 
                                                  
9  Before AFTA, there was Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) established in 1975, which was 
originally called the Bangkok Agreement. APTA includes India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Republic of 
Korea, and the PRC.  
10  Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  
11  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   5 
 
 
and ASEAN but also among ASEAN members. At the same time, we should note that 
intraregional intensity in ASEAN declined during the same period. This means that while 
production networks have connected ASEAN countries with each other, they have 
connected ASEAN countries with Japan to an even greater degree.   
 
In summary, ASEAN members conduct relatively large amounts of trade with each other 
even though most are small trading nations. As a result, ASEAN’s intraregional trade 
intensity and introversion are at least as high as that of the EU and NAFTA. It is 
therefore wrong to argue that ASEAN’s trade integration is insignificant based on an 
analysis of intraregional trade share alone.  
 
2.3.   Trade Interdependence of Various ASEAN+1 Groupings 
 
The main finding of the previous section is that ASEAN’s intraregional trade intensity and 
introversion are high, while its intraregional trade share is low since most ASEAN 
members are relatively small trading nations. This demonstrates the importance of 
including a relatively large trading nation in any trade integration scheme. Therefore, 
which additional country (“+1”) will raise ASEAN+1’s intraregional trade share above that 
of ASEAN’s while also maintaining relatively high intensity and introversion indexes? We 
will analyze Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the US as possible 
candidates. Because of their relatively small trade interaction with ASEAN countries, 
adding Australia or India does not impact the figures.  
 
The ASEAN+Japan group records a higher intraregional share and lower intraregional 
intensity and introversion indices than ASEAN (Figure 2). The intraregional share of 
ASEAN+Japan significantly increased between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, mainly 
due to the establishment of production networks by Japanese MNCs triggered by the 
sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985. The share has 
remained at roughly the same level over the last 15 years. In terms of intraregional 
intensity and regional introversion, the indices began increasing in the mid-1980s and 
have maintained this trend ever since. The difference in the trends among share, 
intensity, and introversion in the last 15  years implies that trade interdependence 
between Japan and ASEAN deepened in relative (but not absolute) terms after the mid-
1990s. Furthermore, Japan may be regarded as a regional trader, unlike the PRC, 
because the trade interdependence of a regional grouping of ASEAN+Japan is much 
more significant than a grouping of ASEAN+PRC.     
 
The group of ASEAN+PRC has lower indices than ASEAN only for share, intensity, and 
introversion. Such a fact is striking given the common belief that the PRC is a driving 
force behind trade integration in Asia. However, the reality is that the PRC is a global 
trader rather than a regional trader. Accordingly, the inclusion of the PRC decreases the 
value of all indices. Moreover, while the intraregional share of ASEAN+PRC maintains 
the same level, the intensity and introversion of this grouping has significantly declined in 
the last decade. In 2000–2009, the intensity index declined from 2.0 to 1.3 and the 
introversion index from 0.4 to 0.2. Despite the rapid growth of the PRC’s overall trade, 
ASEAN’s trade with the PRC has not increased much. While such a situation is 
understandable given that the PRC is  a  global  trader,  the  fact  that  indices  regarding  6   |   Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 91 
 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































EU 15 NAFTA ASEAN+3 ASEAN
 
 
  ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, EU = European Union, NAFTA = North American Free Trade Area. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN Comtrade Data. Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   7 
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ASEAN ASEAN+JPN ASEAN+PRC ASEAN+3 ASEAN+USA
 
 
  ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, JPN = Japan, KOR = Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic 
of China, US = United States. 
 
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on UN Comtrade Data. 8   |   Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 91 
 
 
intensity and introversion in an ASEAN+PRC grouping have sharply declined in the past 
decade is remarkable.  
 
Just like the case of ASEAN+PRC, the grouping of ASEAN+US has lower indices for 
share, intensity, and introversion than ASEAN only. In fact, ASEAN+US has lower 
readings than ASEAN+PRC for all three indices. This is not unexpected since the US is 
also a global trading nation. However, unlike the case of ASEAN+PRC, all three indices 
for ASEAN+US show increasing trends. While the introversion index of ASEAN+US was 
once negative, it was nearing zero by 2009, suggesting that this group now has an 
internal trade bias.  
 
In summary, Regional trade introversion gives us the clearest picture of the degree of 
trade interdependence among various ASEAN+1 groupings. The regional introversion of 
ASEAN+Japan is only slightly lower than that of ASEAN. However, the regional 
introversion of ASEAN+PRC is much lower than ASEAN’s and this ratio has followed a 
declining trend in the last decade. This can be explained by the PRC being a global  
rather than a regional trader. Meanwhile, the regional introversion of ASEAN+US has 
traditionally been negative, although it recently approached zero. In short, the level and 
recent development of trade interdependence among various ASEAN+1 groupings are 
significantly diverse.   
 
2.4.   Trade Interdependence of ASEAN+3  
 
While the conclusion of an ASEAN+3 FTA is unlikely in the near future, we will still 
analyze the level of trade interdependence among ASEAN+3 members given the 
group’s political significance. Although data on various sets of East Asian countries is 
used in examining East Asian trade interdependence, the results are often similar to the 
results based on ASEAN+3 data.
12 Thus, it is very useful to assess the level of trade 
interdependence among ASEAN+3 using a variety of indicators. 
 
The intraregional share of ASEAN+3 trade is higher than that of not only ASEAN but 
also ASEAN+Japan and ASEAN+PRC. It increased significantly during the mid-1980s 
and mid-1990s, although it has shown a declining trend in the last 5 years. However, 
from the high intraregional share of ASEAN+3 trade we cannot conclude that trade 
interdependence in ASEAN+3 has deepened. First, the high intraregional share in 
ASEAN+3 is due to the nature of the index as increases in the number of countries 
included tend to raise the index. The ASEAN+3 group’s share is still lower than that of 
the EU and almost the same as NAFTA’s, which has only three members. It is important 
to carefully analyze the trade interdependence of ASEAN+3 using other indicators. 
Another interesting issue is that the intraregional share of ASEAN+3 is much higher than 
that of ASEAN+Japan or ASEAN+PRC. This implies that trade between Japan and the 
PRC is quite significant. In effect, the intraregional share of ASEAN+3 is much higher 
than that of ASEAN not because of high levels of trade between ASEAN and Japan or 
ASEAN and the PRC, but rather because of trade between Japan and the PRC.  
 
                                                  
12  Some East Asian groupings include not only ASEAN+3 countries but also economies such as 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China.  Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   9 
 
 
The intraregional trade intensity of ASEAN+3 has maintained a near constant level over 
the last 3 decades and is much lower than that of ASEAN. It is also lower than NAFTA’s 
and almost the same as the EU’s. In order to understand the intensity index as it applies 
to ASEAN+3, we should compare it with trends in the intensity indexes of ASEAN+Japan 
and ASEAN+PRC. As we have already seen, the intensity index of ASEAN+Japan 
increased between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, while the intensity index of 
ASEAN+PRC has declined over the last 3 decades, particularly in recent years. As a 
result of this combination of the “pulling-up” effects from ASEAN+Japan and the 
“pushing- down” effects from ASEAN+PRC, movement in the trade intensity index of 
ASEAN+3 has been relatively stable. But if we observe carefully, we find that Japan’s 
pulling-up effects were larger than the PRC’s pushing-down effects until 2000, leading to 
a slight increasing trend in the trade intensity of ASEAN+3 over this period. The PRC’s 
impact subsequently became larger than Japan’s after 2000 due to the increasing weight 
of the PRC’s trade in Asia, which is reflected in a slight decline in the trade intensity of 
ASEAN+3 after 2000.  
 
The introversion index of ASEAN+3 is very low. While the low level of trade 
interdependence in ASEAN+3 is not immediately obvious when looking at intraregional 
trade share and trade intensity, we can conclude that regional trade bias in ASEAN+3 is 
much lower than that of the EU and NAFTA based on the introversion index; the 
introversion index for ASEAN+3 is about 0.5 compared with about 0.7 for both the EU 
and NAFTA. As in the case of trade intensity, Japan’s influence was most significant 
before 2000, while the PRC’s influence becomes dominant after 2000. More precisely, 
the introversion of ASEAN+3 increases from about 0.4 in the mid-1980s to 0.6 in the 
early 2000s due to the establishment of production networks by Japanese MNCs, but it 
deceased to 0.5 by 2009 because of the increasing weight of the PRC whose trade does 
not have a regional bias.   
 
In summary, although the intraregional trade share of ASEAN+3 is high, this is partly due 
to the mathematical feature of the indicator. Specifically, a group with a larger number of 
participants will tend to have a higher intraregional trade share. Thus, we should look at 
other indicators. The introversion of ASEAN+3 is much lower than that of both the EU 
and NAFTA. While the introversion of ASEAN+3 increased until around 2000 due to 
Japanese MNC production networks, it has declined in recent years due to the 
increasing weight of the PRC’s trade in Asia, with the PRC being a global, rather than 
regional, trader.  
 
2.5.   Trade Interdependence of Various ASEAN+3+1 Groupings  
 
We have found that while the trade intensity and introversion of ASEAN is significant—
even more significant than either the EU or NAFTA with respect to introversion—the 
intraregional trade share of ASEAN is low because of members’ small absolute amounts 
of trade. Meanwhile, ASEAN+3’s trade interdependence is very low, especially when we 
look at the introversion index. In this section, we will discuss which “+1” country will have 
the greatest impact on the index when added to the ASEAN+3 group. We will analyze 
Australia, India, and the US in turn.   
 10   |   Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 91 
 
 
The trade interdependence between ASEAN and Australia is not that high as evident by 
indices that are similar to those of ASEAN. On the other hand, trade interdependence 
between Australia and the “+3” countries of the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
is significant and the inclusion of Australia in the grouping leads to higher readings for all 
three indices (Figure 3). This is expected given that the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea are all large importers of Australian agricultural products and natural resources. 
The overall trends since the mid-1980s of the intraregional share of ASEAN+3+Australia 
and ASEAN+3 are almost the same, with the former consistently posting readings about 
0.04 higher than the latter. For example, the share of ASEAN+3 in 2009 is 0.38 while 
that of ASEAN+3+Australia is 0.42. While Australia’s positive impact on the intensity 
ratio is limited, the impact becomes very clear when we look at introversion. The 
introversion index of ASEAN+3+Australia has been higher than that of ASEAN+3 by 
more than 0.05 over the last 3 decades. In 2009, the introversion of ASEAN+3 is 0.48, 
while that of ASEAN+3+Australia reaches 0.54. In short, trade interdependence among 
ASEAN+3+Australia is quite significant. Although the overall trends of introversion 
among ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+3+Australia are similar, we should not overlook the 
underlying rising trend of the latter group. While the level of introversion of ASEAN+3 in 
2009 is the same level as in 1994 (0.49), the introversion of ASEAN+3+Australia in 2009 
(0.54) is higher than in 1994 (0.52).  
 
Figure 4 shows the intraregional trade share of each country of an ASEAN+3+Australia 
group. While Australia’s share in world trade is relatively small at about 1%, ASEAN+3 
countries conduct a relatively large share of their global trade (3%–5% on average) with 
Australia. Thus, the inclusion of Australia makes the grouping’s level of trade 
interdependence higher. As long as ASEAN+3+Australia grouping is concerned, all 
members’ intraregional trade share is around 50% or more, with the notable exception of 
the PRC. Comparing the grouping’s intraregional trade shares against average shares of 
global trade (about 25%), we can conclude that the trade bias (intensity) of 
ASEAN+3+Australia is very high.  
 
The inclusion of India does not have a significant impact on the intraregional trade share 
as the intraregional share of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+3+India are almost the same. 
Meanwhile, the inclusion of India has negative impacts on indicators for trade intensity 
and introversion. Thus, we conclude that trade interdependence between India and 
ASEAN+3 countries is not yet significant.  
 
The intraregional share of the ASEAN+3+US grouping is much higher than ASEAN+3 
because the US is an important trade partner of all countries in the world, including 
Asian countries. Thus, high readings for the intraregional trade share among 
ASEAN+3+US are not due to the high level of trade interdependence between the US 
and Asian countries. In fact, trade intensity and introversion among ASEAN+3+US are 
low. Given the fact that the trade introversion of ASEAN+US are negative, positive 
figures for introversion among ASEAN+3+US implies that trade interdependence 
between the US and the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea is higher than between 
ASEAN and the US.  
 Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   11 
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Figure 4: Intraregional Trade Share of ASEAN+3+Australia, 2009 
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ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN Comtrade Data. 
 
 
In summary, while the intraregional trade share of ASEAN+3 is high, its trade intensity 
and introversion are low. If we add Australia to the group and compute intensity and 
introversion, the figures become much higher. The trade interdependence of 
ASEAN+3+Australia is substantial. In contrast, the trade interdependence of 
ASEAN+3+India is low in terms of share, intensity, and introversion. The introversion of 
ASEAN+US is negative, while that of ASEAN+3+US is positive due to the high level of 
trade interdependence between the US and the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
However, the level of the trade introversion indicator of ASEAN+3+US is not that high.   
 
 
3.   Relation between Trade Interdependence and Free Trade 
Agreements 
 
3.1.   Two Types of Free Trade Agreements 
 
Asian countries have been heavily engaged in FTA negotiations in the last decade. By 
the Asian Development Bank’s count, there are 238 FTAs involving Asian countries that 
have been concluded and/or are under negotiation.
13 Based on the simple observation of 
a preponderance of FTAs, many have argued that Asia is in the process of deepening its 
level of de jure integration.   
 
However, the factors behind the FTA phenomenon have not been fully analyzed. In 
particular, the relation between de facto and de jure trade integration has not been 
studied sufficiently. Many commentators argue that trade in Asia is integrating based on 
the increasing number of FTAs and the fact that several trade indicators (usually share 
or intensity) are exhibiting increasing trends. However, the very relationship between the 
two has not attracted sufficient attention. While one tends to assess whether or not the 
                                                  
13  See Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) website, http://aric.adb.org/  Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   13 
 
 
proliferation of FTAs in Asia can be explained by the overall development of trade 
interdependence in the region,
14 such a general analysis does not reveal much about the 
relationship between de facto and de jure trade integration. Rather, we need to examine 
the level of economic interdependence of a particular set of Asian countries and 
consider whether this affects the modality of economic agreements among them.     
 
There are two hypotheses with regard to the relationship between de facto and de jure 
trade integration. The first hypothesis holds that an increasing trend of trade 
interdependence between/among countries leads to the conclusion of FTAs 
between/among them. Some international relations scholars consider that an agreement 
becomes necessary, because economic interdependence brings problems that require 
collective action.
15 They argue that policymakers tend to formalize or institutionalize the 
management of increasingly complex and dense economic interdependencies within a 
region rather than solving issues through ad hoc political bargaining (Keohane 1993, 
Petri 1993). In their view, states cooperate to solve common problems arising from 
economic interdependencies.  
 
Another type of hypothesis, which suggests the opposite causality, is also plausible. For 
policy perspective, many trade economists and policymakers argue that economic 
agreements are necessary to exploit the trade potential between the members that has 
yet to be realized.
16 There is more room for materializing potential trade if the actual 
level of trade interdependence is still low. Thus, we can theoretically argue that a low 
level of interdependence is a valid reason for signing a regional trade agreement.   
 
3.2.   Free Trade Agreements Resulting from High Levels of Trade 
Interdependence  
 
A typical example of an FTA resulting from high levels of trade interdependence is 
NAFTA. Trade interdependence among the three North American countries had been 
increasing prior to the conclusion of the FTA, especially during the second half of the 
1980s. Andrew Hurrell has argued that “the choice facing the US and Mexico in the 
NAFTA process was not whether or not to move closer to each other, but rather whether 
the management of the increasingly complex and dense economic, environmental, and 
societal interdependencies that had emerged over the past 40 years should be 
formalized or institutionalized, or left to ad hoc political bargaining” (Hurrell 1995, p. 63). 
The North American countries needed a comprehensive agreement such as NAFTA to 
solve the problems associated with deepening de facto integration.  
 
Trade interdependence between Japan and ASEAN increased after the mid-1980s. 
Japanese MNCs rapidly increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN when 
the Japanese yen sharply appreciated against the dollar following the Plaza Accord in 
                                                  
14  For example, Ravenhill (2010) tests the hypothesis that increased interdependence among East Asian 
economies has been responsible for the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia and enhanced financial 
cooperation such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Mulitlateralization.  
15     Those scholars are usually called (neo-liberal) institutionalists (Hurrel 1995).  
16     In the case of Asia, many argue that FTAs between India and other Asian countries are necessary on 
the grounds that such FTAs materialize the potential trade between them. For example, see: 
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1985. Due to the production networks forged by Japanese MNCs, more trade, especially 
intra-corporation trade, was being conducted in the region. By 2000, economic 
interdependence between the two had already become significant and was marked by 
complex economic structures.  
 
Given these developments, we can easily understand the rationale of the ASEAN–Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) proposed in 2002 and signed in 2010. A 
comprehensive agreement was required by both Japan and ASEAN. The EPA actually 
exceeds the coverage of a typical FTA and illustrates the desire of the contracting 
countries, especially Japan, to seek comprehensive de jure regional economic 
integration, particularly with respect to investment and services. In addition, the 
harmonization of various standards is an important component of the EPA as far as 
Japan is concerned (Hatch 2004).  
 
It is undeniable that political motivations triggered negotiations over the EPA, with the 
Japanese Prime Minister proposing an ASEAN–Japan EPA soon after the PRC had 
proposed the ASEAN–PRC FTA. At the same time, however, economic conditions 
demanded a comprehensive integration agreement between Japan and ASEAN given 
significant de facto economic integration resulting from Japanese investments dating 
back to the mid-1980s. Because trade between Japan and ASEAN, as well as 
investments to build-up production networks, were already significant, a more complex 
mechanism to solve problems associated with trade interdependence was required to 
avoid the application of ad hoc solutions.  
 
3.3.   Free Trade Agreements Resulting from Low Levels of Trade 
Interdependence 
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was one of the first FTAs in Asia. In 1991, ASEAN 
Economic Ministers agreed to endorse AFTA and the Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) at the ASEAN Summit in 1992. The purpose of 
establishing AFTA was to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production base for 
global markets (Austria and Avila 2001). Given that trade interdependence within 
ASEAN had been declining since the 1980s, such a policy objective is  understandable. 
Trade interdependence within ASEAN in terms of introversion declined significantly 
during the second half of the 1980s: from 0.73 in 1985 to 0.66 in 1990. ASEAN needed 
to liberalize trade so that the production bases and networks in the region could become 
more effective. Thus, it is plausible to consider that AFTA was expected to reverse the 
declining trend of trade interdependence within ASEAN.
17  A goods-centered, shallow 
agreement was sufficient to achieve this purpose. Yet, a more comprihensive agreement 
is becoming necessary as economic interdependence among ASEAN members 
increases.  
 
Despite the common view that Asian trade integration is driven by the PRC, we have 
observed that trade interdependence between the PRC and ASEAN is relatively 
                                                  
15  What is interesting is that the decline in trade interdependence seems to have been the trigger of de 
jure trade integration in South Asia. While the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed 
in 2006, intraregional trade interdependence in South Asia dropped significantly after 2003.  Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   15 
 
 
insignificant and has actually been declining. This is because the PRC is increasingly 
becoming a global, rather than a regional, trader. For example, the regional trade 
introversion index for ASEAN+PRC declined from 0.6 in 1980 to 0.4 in 2000. It was 
under such circumstances that the ASEAN–PRC FTA was first proposed. The 
agreement between ASEAN and the PRC emphasizes trade in goods by describing itself 
as an FTA, unlike the EPA between ASEAN and Japan. It also includes a significant 
Early Harvest Program on agricultural trade. Thus, we can argue that the fundamental 
purpose of the ASEAN–PRC FTA was to boost trade between the two as quickly as 
possible. Such a policy strategy is valid given that ASEAN has not been able to trade 
with the PRC as much as had been expected. In short, the ASEAN–PRC FTA was 
needed because ASEAN sought to increase its trade with the PRC. More precisely, 
ASEAN sought to arrest the declining trend of trade interdependence with the PRC, 
especially with respect to exports.  
 
The background of the ASEAN–India FTA is similar to that of the ASEAN–PRC FTA. 
Given the low level of trade interdependence between ASEAN and India, an FTA was 
viewed as having the potential to increase trade between the two. In fact, the ASEAN–
India FTA places an emphasis on the traditional area of an FTA, which is trade in goods. 
One difference between the ASEAN–PRC FTA and ASEAN–India FTA is that the former 
seeks to address the problems of declining trade interdependence between ASEAN and 
the PRC, while the latter aims to generate potential trade. Trade interdependence 
between ASEAN and India has increased  recently although the level remains low.   
 
If an ASEAN–US FTA is proposed, it will be to achieve the goal of increasing trade 
between ASEAN and the US, especially ASEAN’s exports to US markets.
18 From the 
perspective of the US, more tangible outputs in fields other than trade in goods will be a 
requirement for signing an FTA. In particular, investment protection, intellectual property 
protection, and services liberalization are essential to the US. Perhaps this difference in 
preferences is one of the reasons why there has not been significant progress in 
negotiations over an economic agreement.  
 
 
4.   Policy Implications  
 
This paper’s analysis on trade interdependence in Asia has clear policy implications for 
the membership and scope of de jure agreements. It should be noted that neither 
membership nor scope is a determining factor of one another. Rather, it is relevant to 
consider that the membership and scope of agreements, including the appropriate 
modalities, are in part determined by economic interdependence structures among 
(potential) participants.   
 
It is fruitless to argue over the appropriate membership of an FTA without carefully 
analyzing the level and nature of trade and economic interdependence among various 
sets of countries in a region. In Asia, a simple argument in favor of a region-wide FTA to 
cover the entire geographical region is not convincing enough. An economic rationale for 
                                                  
16  In addition, from ASEAN’s perspective maintaining the continuous engagement of the US in Southeast 
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the membership of an existing or hypothetical regional agreement should be examined 
based on economic interdependence. For example, the trend and structure of trade 
interdependence between ASEAN and the PRC differ from those between ASEAN and 
Japan. This is one of the reasons why negotiations over an FTA among ASEAN+3 
members have failed to gain momentum.  
 
Likewise, it is also fruitless to argue the appropriate scope of de jure agreements without 
also carefully examining the level and nature of trade and economic interdependence 
among potential members. A simple argument such as “the more comprehensive the 
scope of regional agreement, the better” is not convincing enough. The required 
comprehensiveness of an agreement or the modality of agreements varies from group to 
group, depending on the level and trend of economic interdependence among group 
members. A set of countries attempting to solve the same types of problems tends to 
sign a regional agreement. The problems are not limited to those caused by increased 
trade interdependence among members. Declining interdependence can also be a 
problem addressed through an FTA. Since economic interdependence between ASEAN 
and the PRC was declining, an agreement to quickly boost trade was required. In the 
case of ASEAN and Japan, an agreement was needed to solve the problems associated 
with a high level of interdependence. Given differences in the economic 
interdependence structures of ASEAN+Japan and ASEAN+PRC, each needs a tailor-
made agreement to serve members’ specific objectives. Thus, there appears to be little 
rationale to pursue an ASEAN+3 FTA. 
 
While it is not easy to make a generalized argument based on the limited number of 
cases analyzed in this paper, a preliminary observation can be made based on the 
scope of the agreements reviewed. North–South FTAs that bring together developed 
and developing countries, especially developed and developing countries that are 
located near one another, tend to be more comprehensive agreements because 
members need to manage complex issues arising from substantial economic integration. 
NAFTA and the ASEAN–Japan EPA are illustrative examples. Meanwhile, South–South 
FTAs tend to be shallow goods-centered agreements since their immediate goal is to 
interrupt a declining trend of trade interdependence between members.     
 
The variety of trade interdependence structures among economies in Asia may explain 
the proliferation of FTAs in the region. Because economic interdependence structures 
between various Asian countries are heterogeneous, Asia needs different types of FTAs 
for different sets of countries in order to serve the specific shared objective of each 
group. Thus, rather than having a single pan-Asian FTA encompassing all countries in 
the region, bilateral and plurilateral FTAs appear to be policymakers’ preferred options in 
meeting the actual needs of countries.  
 
The empirical analysis contained in this paper provides insight into a future in which 
Asian policymakers pursue an FTA with a larger set of countries, if not a region-wide 
FTA or pan-Asian FTA. At least in terms of the level of trade interdependence, 
ASEAN+3+Australia seems to be more reasonable than an ASEAN+3 FTA. The trade 
interdependence of ASEAN+3+Australia is much higher than that of ASEAN+3 and is 
expected to become as significant as that of the EU and NAFTA in the near future. 
Because economic interdependence among ASEAN+3+Australia is high, a more Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?   |   17 
 
 
comprehensive agreement seems to be suitable for the group. The majority of this 
group—including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and most ASEAN countries—
prefer a comprehensive agreement among them. For example, given the significance of 
food trade among members, having provisions calling for harmonization of food and 
safety standards (sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade) seems 
reasonable. Moreover, because some Asian countries import a large amount of energy 
resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) from Australia, provisions addressing environmental 
issues would appear to be an essential component of an FTA to effectively manage 
trade and economic integration among members. In short, a comprehensive agreement 
among ASEAN+3+Australia to solve complex issues resulting from interdependence 
seems better than a shallow agreement that merely aims to boost trade among 
members.    
 
 
5.   Conclusion  
 
In designing regional economic agreements, it is important to carefully examine the level 
and structure of trade interdependence among potential members. The rationale for 
forming economic agreements can be based on either high or low levels of trade 
interdependence. Countries sometimes need a relatively comprehensive agreement 
(e.g.,  substantial investment and intellectual property protection) to solve issues 
associated with high levels of trade interdependence. Meanwhile, a set of countries 
whose level of economic interdependence is low or declining may require a goods-
centered agreement to boost trade between members. 
   
Given that intraregional trade interdependence in ASEAN began declining in the mid-
1980s, it is understandable that AFTA was established to reverse this trend and 
revitalize production networks in the region. Because trade interdependence between 
ASEAN and the PRC had been similarly declining, an agreement to boost trade between 
the two was necessary and a shallow goods-centered agreement was sufficient for 
serving this purpose. In contrast, ASEAN and Japan needed a more comprehensive 
agreement due to the level of economic interdependence generated by the production 
networks of Japanese MNCs. Because of different economic interdependence structures 
among various sets of Asian countries, especially differences between ASEAN–Japan 
and ASEAN–PRC, networking Asia with a series of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs has 
been more effective than having a region-wide FTA that includes all members of 
ASEAN+3.  
 
If policymakers wished to pursue a larger FTA that includes wider membership and still 
considers levels of economic interdependence among potential members, a grouping of 
ASEAN+3+Australia would be more appropriate than ASEAN+3 alone. The trade 
interdependence of the former grouping is much higher than that of the latter. In this 
case a more comprehensive agreement covering a range of issues, including the 
harmonization of food and sanitary standards as well as energy and environmental 
issues, would be necessary to solve existing and future problems associated with high 
levels of interdependence among members.  
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When trade interdependence between countries is low, they tend to sign a shallow goods-
centered agreement to boost trade between them. In contrast, when a high level of trade 
interdependence is already achieved and the economic interdependence structure between 
them is complex, a deep agreement that formalizes economic relations is required to avoid 
ad hoc political bargaining. This difference is the key to understanding the rationale of the 
noodle bowl of FTAs in Asia.    
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